Labor Law - Federal Pre-Emption - An Inroad Through the Violence Doctrine by Day, Richard E.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 55 Issue 3 
1957 
Labor Law - Federal Pre-Emption - An Inroad Through the Violence 
Doctrine 
Richard E. Day 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons, Legal Remedies Commons, and the Torts 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Richard E. Day, Labor Law - Federal Pre-Emption - An Inroad Through the Violence Doctrine, 55 MICH. L. 
REV. 454 (1957). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol55/iss3/10 
 
This Recent Important Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law 
Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, 
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
454 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 55 
LABOR LAW-FEDERAL PRE-EMPTION-AN INROAD THROUGH THE VIOLENCE 
DOCTRINE-The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's en-
forcement of an order obtained by the Kohler Company from the Wiscon-
sin Employment Relations Board enjoining the appellant union, as a 
violation of the "Wisconsin Employment Peace Act,1 from further engaging 
in mass picketing, coercion, and other activities, which were also unfair 
labor practices under the amended National Labor Relations Act,2 to which 
the Kohler Company was subject. On appeal to the United States Supreme 
Court, held, affirmed, three justices dissenting. While, as a general matter, 
a state may not, in furtherance of its public policy, enjoin conduct which 
has been made an unfair labor practice under the federal statutes, an in-
junction based on the dominant interest of the state in preventing violence 
and property damage can properly be granted. The dissenting justices 
1 Wis. Stat. (1955) §§111.04, 111.06 (2) (a) and (f), 111.07 (1). 
2 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §8 (b) (1) (A). 
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maintained that a state cannot duplicate an administrative remedy pre-
scribed by Congress reaching identical conduct. United Automobile Work-
ers v. WERB, 351 U.S. 266 (1956). 
As explained in Garner v. Teamsters Union, "when two separate 
remedies are brought to bear on the same activity, a conflict is imminent. 
... To avoid facing a conflict between the state and federal remedies, we 
would have to assume either that both authorities will always agree as to 
whether the picketing should continue, or that the State's temporary in-
junc~on will be dissolved as soon as the federal Board acts."3 Since it was 
within the power of the Board to grant an injunction in that case, the 
power of the state court was held to be pre-empted in order to avoid a 
conflict of remedy. This doctrine was approved and explained further in 
United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Construction Corp.4 in which 
the Court stated that "To the extent that Congress prescribed preventive 
procedure against unfair labor practices, that case [Garner] recognized that 
the Act excluded conflicting state procedure to the same end." The Court 
there allowed a recovery for tort damages since that remedy was not in 
conflict with any federal remedy. This rule of federal pre-emption to 
avoid a conflict of remedies was again emphasized in the decision in Weber 
v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.5 The Court denied the right of a state to enjoin 
conduct which violated the state restraint of trade law, stating that "Con-
trolling and therefore superseding federal power cannot be curtailed by the 
State even though the ground of intervention be different than that on which 
federal supremacy has been exercised."6 The principal case does not over-
rule Garner, but gives effect to the pre-Taft-Hartley Allen-Bradley• decision 
by excepting from the general rule of pre-emption "mass picketing, violence, 
and overt threats of violence," even though the union commits an unfair 
labor practice and is now subject to issuance of an injunction by the federal 
board. Preventing violence and property damage was said to be "a matter 
of genuine local concern."8 Under this simple "local concern" test it 
would be difficult to justify the Weber decision, since it is at least arguable 
that enjoining conduct which violates state restraint of trade laws is as 
much a local concern as the power to restrain violence.0 It appears that 
the Court is willing to except from the Garner rule only a special type of 
"local concern" activity-protection against violence. It has been suggested 
s Gamer v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 at 498, 499 (1953). 
4 347 U.S. 656 at 665 (1954). 
11348 U.S. 468 (1955). 
G Id. at 480. 
7 Allen-Bradley Local v. WERB, 315 U.S. 740 (1942). The principal case affirms uni-
form state holdings that the federal act does not pre-empt them from enjoining mass 
picketing or picketing accompanied by threats or violence. See 32 A.L.R. (2d) 1026, 1036 
to 1040 (1953). As pointed out by the Court in note 12 at 274 of the principal case, its 
post-Taft-Hartley decisions intimated continued approval of the Allen-Bradley doctrine, 
even though the federal act at that time made no provision for enjoining union activities, 
thus resulting in no conflict of remedies. 
s Principal case at 274. 
9 See 54 MICH, L. REv. 540 at 551 (1956). 
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that perhaps the reason the Court did not except the situation in the Weber 
case from the Garner pre-emption doctrine was the fear or suspicion that 
state regulations were being used as mere devices for circumventing federal 
labor authority-10 Whether or not this possibility was considered in Weber, 
the opportunity for such practices is present under the principal decision.11 
Under this doctrine, the extent to which a state may regulate labor practices 
through injunctions is in great part dependent upon its disposition to find 
the illegal acts of violence threatened and its decision on the extent of reg-
ulation necessary. The awarding of tort damages by a state as a supple-
mental remedy to an injunction by the federal board (as in Laburnum) 
should not. normally interfere with the national labor policy, nor the effec-
tiveness of strategic labor strikes and picketing, since the remedy is con-
cerned with past acts and there wo:uld be time for an appeal and reversal.12 
But where the state is allowed the concurrent power to enjoin, irreparable 
damage to the union's efforts and frustration of the national labor policy 
can result when the state injunction is first granted.13 The Court's decision 
was sound in recognizing the need for protection from violence and overt 
threats of violence.14 It certainly is true, however, as said by Justice Douglas 
in the dissenting opinion, that this sanction of duplication of remedies "is 
pregnant with potentialities of clashes and conflicts."15 The crux of the 
problem lies in the inability of the National Labor Relations Board to cope 
effectively with such emergencies.16 If action by the Board would be ex-
pedited in such instances, it is submitted that injunctions could be granted 
without requiring state action, thereby preventing violence and preserving 
l0ibid. 
11 On the history and' use of the labor injunction see TAYLOR, 1.ABoR PROBLEMS AN!). 
LABOR LAw, 2d ed., 483 to 499, and collateral readings at 499 (1950); U.S. Senate Sub• 
committee on Labor and Labor-Management Relations of the Committee on Labor and 
Public Welfare, "State Court Injunctions" Doc. 7, 82d Cong., 1st sess. (1951), hereinafter 
referred to as Senate Report. 
12 Such an action for damages, however, in addition to an injunction, should increase 
the employers bargaining position and tactical advantages with a union. See Senate Re• 
port, note 11 supra, at 10 and 50. 
13 In addition to possible misapplication of the injunction where proof of the allega-
tion that violence, intimidation, coercion, etc., is inadequate, or the issuance of an injunc-
tion that is broader than required, the unions assert such an injunction is a destructive 
influence far beyond its terms in that it makes it appear to their members that the courts 
are on the side of the company and that a governmental agency has ruled that their stand 
lacks merit. Senate Report, note 11 supra, at 17. This Report points out that the high 
percentage of injunctive orders that are either reversed or modified on appeal ••. "does 
not speak well for the quality of the original proceedings. It is particularly disturbing 
when it is recognized that the time element in most labor disputes is so critical that few 
cases will ever be appealed." (Emphasis added.) Senate Report, note 11 supra, at 18, 48, 
64, and 104. 
14 In answer to the argument that enforcement of state criminal law should protect 
against such unlawful acts, it should be noted that in practice local police are often re-
luctant to interfere in labor disputes until an injunction is issued. See Senate Report, note 
11 supra, at 9, 55, 57 and 86. 
111 Principal case at 276. 
16 See Senate Report, note 11 supra, at 56. 
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the. integrity of the national labor policy simultaneously.11 Until some 
such time, however, it is well that the Court will not "interpret an act of 
Congress to leave [the states] powerless to avert such emergencies without 
compelling directions to that effect.''18 
Richard E. Day 
17 See recommendations in U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Labor and Labor-Manage• 
ment Relations of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, "The Problem of Delay 
in Administering the Labor-Management Relations Act," Staff Report, 82d Cong., 2d 
sess. (1952), and Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, 
Report on Legal Services and Procedure, Recommendation No. 50 at 85, that certain judi-
cial functions, including issuance of injunctive orders by the NLRB be transferred to the 
federal courts. 
18 Principal case at 275. See general comments on federalism in principal case at 270, 
n.4. 
